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Abstract 
 
 
This paper introduces the business model and the problems in the Credit Rating 
Agencies in the US. We describe the development of this business and then focus on 
the critiques on it which, as widely discussed, caused the credit crunch and aggravated 
the financial crisis. We, based on the problems, try to provide proposals in order to 
better regulate the agencies and the business process. We believe the proposals 
discussed in this project will have a positive influence to the rated financial market and 
products. 
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1 Introduction 
 
 
‘In the middle of 2007 and 2008 around the world stock markets have fallen, large 
financial institutions have collapsed or been bought out, and governments in even the 
wealthiest nations have had to come up with rescue packages to bail out their financial 
systems’.1 
 
The U.S. financial crisis began in late 2006 with the mortgage crisis in the sector of 
subprime (poor-quality loans), which resulted in plentiful liquidity and the frivolous 
attitude of mortgage companies to borrowers. CRA played central role in the financial 
system and have been blamed on closely break down situation in 2008.2 
 
CRA played a significant role by issuing a mass of overestimated ratings, which were 
actually bad that created a misjudgment of the investors. They have a great role as 
most of the investors’ look up for the ratings when making their investment decisions. 
There are many reasons of why it happened some suggest that the CRA incompetence 
and ignorance took a toll on the economy and some say it’s their rating methods and 
an issuer-pay model fault that created a conflict of interest. 
 
This paper is focused towards two leading CRA: Moody’s and Standard& Poor’s where 
we illustrate the role of CRA and recommend the improved regulation. 
 
 
1.1 Problem Area 
 
                                                      
1 http://www.globalissues.org/article/768/global-financial-crisis#Acrisissoseveretheworldfinancialsystemisaffected 
2 http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/subjects/c/credit_rating_agencies/index.html 
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The 2008 is well known by the financial crisis that played an important role in lives of 
most of Americans. A lot of people suffered from it as well as most of the businesses 
and financial institutions. 
 
One of the reasons to it is market instability. Inability to create new lines of credit took 
a toll on economic growth as well as it also affected the process of buying and selling of 
assets. ‘Many of the financial institutions were left holding mortgage backed assets 
that had dropped precipitously in value and were not bringing in the amount of money 
needed to pay for the loans’3. That fact resulted in limited control over the cash and 
creation of new loans. 
 
Another reason is undoubtedly greed. ‘Mortgage brokers, acting only as middle men, 
determined who got loans, then passed on responsibility for those loans on to others 
in the form of mortgage backed asset (after taking a fee for themselves originating the 
loan) thousands of people took loans larger than they could afford in the hopes that 
they could either flip the house for profit or refinance later at lower rate and with more 
equity with their home- which they would leverage to purchase another “investment” 
house’.4 Majority of the people lose their rational behavior tendencies when it comes 
to the money. 
 
The housing market decline caused systematic risk that is common to most of the 
companies, that decline created a series of reaction in the economy. ‘Individuals and 
investors could no longer flip their homes for a quick profit, adjustable rates mortgages 
adjusted skyward and mortgages no longer became affordable for many homeowners, 
and thousands of mortgages defaulted, leaving investors and financial institutions 
holding the bag’.5 
 
                                                      
3 http://cashmoneylife.com/economic-financial-crisis-2008-causes/ 
4 http://cashmoneylife.com/economic-financial-crisis-2008-causes/ 
5 http://cashmoneylife.com/economic-financial-crisis-2008-causes/ 
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Credit well dried up, economy become very unstable, people start losing their jobs with 
this one they could not afford to pay back their mortgage fees that in fact also affected 
the financial institutions to make their lending requirements stricter. Some financial 
institutions collided, and some find their way out during the tough times in merging 
whereas some were simply bought out.6 
 
Besides the fact that the U.S. financial crisis has caused serious problems within the 
country, it influenced the entire world economy and caused the global financial crisis. 
Because of the crisis the world experienced the breakdown wave in stock exchanges 
and many other unpleasant things. 
 
‘Perhaps the most popular narrative of the financial crisis maintains that it was caused 
by dismantling of the regulatory structure from 1990 to 2005, and that this 
deregulation enabled greedy financial institutions to take excessive risks that imperiled 
the financial system and the world economy.’7 However there is another way in 
looking at it which called a lack of transparency. ‘Transparency is a short land 
expression for how easily one financial institution could accurately perceive the true 
financial situation of other institution.’8 Where trust and control issues arise, trust and 
information asymmetry played a big role in acquiring a real financial situation of any 
institution. 
 
The Credit Rating Agencies had been massively criticized both for their methods in 
acquiring the rating and a massive downgrade that trigged this hectic consequences. 
‘From the end of 2007 through the middle of 2008, the ratings agencies lowered the 
credit ratings on almost $2 trillion of mortgage-backed securities’.9 There is no 
hesitation in thinking that CRA played enormous so to speak the main role in the 
                                                      
6 http://cashmoneylife.com/economic-financial-crisis-2008-causes/ 
7 Kolb, 2011, p.160-161 
8 Kolb, 2011, p.143-146 
9 Davies, 2010, p.123-124 
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financial crises. ‘It’s common for the investment policy of the financial institutions to 
specify that the portfolio can contain only “investment grade” securities, where this 
means that the securities must have received a rating of a sufficiently high level from 
one or more of the main credit raters: the Moody’s, Standard & Poor’s or Fitch.’10 
 
CRA’s role is to estimate the creditworthiness of individuals and corporations ‘they 
serve as a gatekeeper function – they presumably certify the credit condition of 
securities by assigning an alphabetical rating’11. While issuing a rating those agencies 
use their reputation playing a leading role which affects the investor’s decision making 
process. Nevertheless a lot of the investors trust those ratings. In essence Standard & 
Poor’s and the Moody’s dominated the market. 
 
With all that in mind we intend to investigate the role and best ways in regulating the 
credit rating process. The overall purpose is to find out what strategic challenges and 
future outlook for the CRA will be like. This leads us to a problem formulation. 
 
 
1.2 Problem Formulation 
 
How could Credit Rating Agencies be better regulated in order to improve the rating 
accuracy and reliability, and to minimize the impact credit default causes to the 
financial market? 
 
In the later context, we use CRA(s) as the abbreviation of Credit Rating Agency(ies).  
 
 
 
                                                      
10 Kolb, 2011,p.174-176 
11 Kolb, 2011,p.174-176 
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1.3 Research Questions 
 
a. What is a role of a CRA?  
 
In this part we can focus towards CRAs overall their business area. What they are 
dealing with. We may start from the historical perspective and their establishment in 
the market. It will be interesting to investigate their particular role in the market with 
regards to the creation of reputation which created a series of reaction in the market 
making Credit Rating Agencies play the leading / dominant role. Where do they come 
from and what do they do. 
 
b. What is the process investors usually take to make financial investment 
decisions? 
 
This question will lead us to look towards another important actor, investors driving 
force in making financial investment decision. How the credit ratings influence what 
will be bought by investor, where investors in return would like to understand what 
they are buying and where they invest their money to. Most of the investors are keen 
towards the business that they understand or familiar with. Track record of institution, 
market incentive makes most of the investors to stick with a well-known agency. 
 
c. What are the malfunctions of the rating activities? 
 
This research question will point out the malfunctions in the CRA activities during 
financial crisis. Based on the historical analysis and the regulatory framework we will 
be able to weight out the malfunctions that played a big role during those times. We 
will focus on information asymmetry concept that plays a key role in acquiring real 
financial situation of any institution. An issuer- pay model concept which results in 
conflict of interest where CRA profited by giving the analysis and issuing ratings 
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resulted in ratings that were overestimated too much where their incompetence 
results in conflict of interest. Another one is a competition concept of CRA in the 
market as opposed to only having three leading Credit Rating Agencies may result in 
more accurate credit ratings. However if having people to compete might result in 
worse rating if the issues pay model stays. 
 
d. Which regulatory mechanisms can be used to correct these malfunctions? 
 
In this research question we will discuss different types of regulating forms but mainly 
focus towards American governmental regulations.  What act did government pass in 
order to have an investigate commission over CRA what is their scope of the authority 
in relation to credit rating methods. We will discuss different types of institutions and 
commissions that had a regulative power. We will also focus towards stakeholder 
theory look at the problem from the relationships between CRAs and issuers, CRAs and 
investors. And focus towards the importance of CSR in relation to CRA government 
participation and macroeconomic control. 
 
 
1.4 Motivation 
 
We are derived to seek a goal in investigating and possibly coming up with the best 
regulation proposition with regards to our research area. Our motivation is interrelated 
with a curiosity that moves us as a group to seek an answer to our problem 
formulation. That drives us to use a relevant data in the process. Before reaching our 
desired goal we set a new goal further out, that what happened in our previous project 
which motivated us to have our mind in investigating CRA methods. 
 
Our personal motivation is having a string of goals that are realistic and challenging at 
the same time. We are working to constantly understand what is important to us and 
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how we will know when we get there. Creativity and a strong belief encourage us to 
integrate ourselves fully in project work. 
 
Our academic motivation has its roots from our previous project work whereas the 
topic itself is very interesting with regards to the financial institutions their role and 
rating methods. . It is also very interesting topic to look at CRA as financial institutions 
in relation to their function and their leading role in the market. 
 
It will be exciting how well we could assimilate our theories in the project. The driving 
forces for us are commitment energy, excitement and a mindset to continue the 
development of our project 
 
Credit rating agencies contributed to the financial crisis there had been a lot of 
proposal to better regulate their activities on the financial market, where they play a 
leading role, in influencing the decision making process among many investors. 
Financial crisis had impacted badly most of the country’s economy resulting in an 
economic crisis of the world. 
 
Our project is not concerned with other seemingly simpler solutions in relation to the 
CRA role in financial crisis, instead choosing more sustainable long-term solutions. We 
aim to provide some necessary tools to address the above mentioned problems. It is 
important to note that we are looking for long-term sustainable solutions to which the 
market cannot provide, in relation of better ways in regulating CRA processes. 
 
 
1.5 Limitations 
 
Our limitations, in terms of the collection of data, are based primarily on concerns with 
obtaining a secondary data, with regards to our topic. Whereas conducting interviews 
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with CRA representative and getting a primary data would be not possible in our case 
as we are not able to travel long distances and obtain a primary data. We are also faced 
with a time limit in our project which makes it impossible for us to travel. This fact 
limits our access to people and organizations with it gaining a primary data. 
 
Limitation with regards space and money will be quite modest, as we do not need 
money in order to obtain an empirical material, neither do we not require traveling 
long distances. That limitation is precisely in relation to the time we spend gathering 
empirical material. We focus towards US and their situation with regards to the 
financial crisis. The data that we use is influenced by historical as well as economic 
changes during financial crisis. We concentrate towards American government 
regulation angle, where our literature is mainly affected by different political 
perspectives in relation to our problem formulation. 
 
Financial crisis and its affect is a too large sample size thus it will be difficult to make a 
deep and exact analysis that is why time frame in our project is 2000-2010 we have 
chosen two very well-known credit rating agencies: Moody’s and Standard& Poor’s. 
The data chosen is official data, and is analyzed with the theories. We will use 
academic published books, e-books and scientific articles. 
 
We are also aware that the data collected is a secondary data as opposed to the 
primary. And that it will only give us a limited view to the research area. 
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2 Theory 
 
 
2.1 Financial Investment Behaviours 
 
In this section, we refer to the theories with regard to some familiar behaviours (errors 
to be more precisely) investors always have when doing investment in financial markets. 
The investment behaviours we will discuss here is not the one under the framework of 
the neoclassical economics, which is probably the study on the investment behaviours 
exclusively in real industries and manufactures. That is to say, we focus on the 
investment behaviours in the modern financial activities. In spite of that, we will look at 
it from both financial and psychological points of view. We believe it will work better to 
see how people in real context react to the financial events. So it will be about what is 
ought to be done and what are actually the errors and troubles. 
 
We will use the most relevant theories to our project topic. The book we will refer to is 
named Fundamentals of Corporate Finance, edited by David Hillier et al. which we 
think is quite professional, clear cut and nice reading.  
 
2.1.1 Risks and Diversification  
 
In any investment, there is the portion of surprises which are known as risks. If without 
surprises, the market is risk-free, and we will always receive what we expect. However, 
the risk-free market does not exist in reality and we often face various sources of 
risks.12 The two counterparts of risks are widely known as Systematic Risk and 
Unsystematic Risk. 
 
                                                      
12 Hillier et al., 2011, p.354 
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? Systematic risk defines ‘a risk that influences a large number of assets’; and 
? Unsystematic risk defines ‘a risk that affects at most a small number of assets’.13 
 
Systematic risk objectively exists and acts the same to everyone in the market. The 
factors of systematic risk include macroeconomic stability, interest rate, GDP growth, 
government policies and etc. Therefore, systematic risk could not be eliminated by 
investment methods.  
 
Unsystematic risk, on the contrary, can be eliminated by diversified investment. As 
unsystematic risk illustrates a risk that affects a certain company or a kind of industry 
or security, when people put their money among diversified equities, the power of a 
certain risk can be weakened. The principle of diversification tells us that ‘spreading an 
investment across a number of assets will eliminate some, but not all, of the risk’.14 
Here the eliminated risk is the unsystematic risk, and that remaining is the systematic 
risk. This concept is also known as portfolio theory, which to be briefly defined here, 
‘unsystematic risk is eliminated by diversification, so a portfolio with many assets has 
almost no unsystematic risk’.15 
 
2.1.2 Behavioural Finance 
 
Behavioural finance is about how people think before making financial decisions. It is 
the study on ‘the implications of reasoning errors on financial decisions…Much of the 
research done in the behavioural finance area stems from work in cognitive 
psychology’.16 The errors can be divided into three main categories: Biases, Framing 
Effects and Heuristics.17 
 
                                                      
13 Hillier et al., 2011, p.355 
14 Hillier et al., 2011, p.357 
15 Hillier et al., 2011, p.358 
16 Hillier et al., 2011, p.583 
17 Hillier et al., 2011, p.583 
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? Biases, if it exists, leads to systematic errors in judgement. ‘The type of error 
depends on the type of bias’.18 
? Framing effects refer to the frame dependence individuals have when making 
different decisions, ‘depending on how a question or problem is framed’.19 
? Heuristics is the instinct in making decisions. It is defined as ‘shortcuts or rules of 
thumb used to make decisions.’20 
 
All of them are very important and relevant here. We first start from the Biases. 
According to Hillier et al. there are three main kinds of biases: overconfidence, 
over-optimism and confirmation bias.21 
 
Overconfidence demonstrates ‘the belief that your abilities are better than they really 
are’.22 The most common form of this in the financial activities is the self-confidence to 
precisely forecast the future. This leads the investors to ignore the unsystematic risks 
and put all the money in the best equities that they believe. In this situation, portfolio 
theory and diversification are forgotten and investors actually display themselves in a 
riskier position. This also leads investors to trade more since they believe in their own 
judgement on which equity will best perform in the next day. Research work has 
indicated that the accounts with the most trading perform much worse than the ones 
with the least trading.23 
 
Over-optimism ‘leads to overestimating the likelihood of a good outcome and 
underestimating the likelihood of a bad outcome’.24 Different from overconfidence 
which is an overestimate on the abilities, over-optimism is an overestimate on the 
potential outcomes. For instance, an investor with such cognition will tend to be 
                                                      
18 Hillier et al., 2011, p.583 
19 Hillier et al., 2011, p.585 
20 Hillier et al., 2011, p.588 
21 Hillier et al., 2011, p.583 
22 Hillier et al., 2011, p.583 
23 Hillier et al., 2011, p.583 
24 Hillier et al., 2011, p.584 
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optimistic if he/she gains 10% in one investment while losing 10% in another at the 
same time. In a financial market where people have the common sense that the values 
of the equities will increase in the long run, the potential risks in the short term would 
probably be underrated. 
 
Confirmation bias defines the error on ‘searching for (and giving more weight to) 
information and opinion that confirms what you believe, rather than information and 
opinion to the contrary’. In another word, it is to ‘focus more on information that 
agrees with your opinion, and to downplay or ignore information that doesn’t agree 
with or support your position’.25 Sometimes it can also be seen as a particular way of 
over-optimism. In financial market, people with confirmation bias may even force to 
optimize the risks, like to believe that the bubble will continue to grow bigger and will 
never burst. On the contrary, when people focus more on the information that agrees 
with their opinions, not necessary to be an optimistic forecast, it shows their 
overconfidence. In this case, they force themselves as well as others to believe that 
they were right at the beginning.  
 
In one word, biases can lead to bad financial decision making. Overconfidence indicates 
the error that people overestimate their abilities to foresee the market trends. 
Over-optimism is the overestimating on the good outcome. And confirmation bias is 
the bigoted bias that him/her-self must to be approved correct. 
 
Framing effects, as it is defined, refer to the frame dependence people have when 
making analysis and decisions. There are many kinds of frames, such as Loss Aversion, 
House Money (regarding casino) and etc. Take credit rating for instance, people may 
not have to believe the rating at the beginning since they have enough of their own 
analysis that they can choose to rely on. However, since most of the people star to look 
at the credit ratings, you may probably be influenced, turn not to believe on yourself, 
                                                      
25 Hillier et al., 2011, p.584 
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as confident as before, and also start to rely on the credit ratings. In this situation, the 
ratings turn to be the frame which cages people’s judgment.26 
 
In this sense, Heuristics is quite similar with the frame dependence. Generally speaking, 
it shows people’s instinct or inertia when making decisions. If people, by habit, have 
got used to rely on something when making their own judgement, they are influenced 
by heuristics. 
 
With regard to our research area, one good example could be that many companies 
and investors have got used to the credit rating when raising funds or investing their 
money, and they pay a lot of money for it and to use the rating agencies’ services.27 
Heuristics, in this sense, delineates a much broader frame effect impacting different 
kinds of players in the financial market. The Behavioural Finance theory, as well as the 
Risks and Diversification will be used in the description of the rating business and its 
development. It will also help to explain the investors’ investment habit on financial 
products, like to use the ratings. 
 
 
2.2 Economics of Information  
 
Economics of information is still a young branch of economics. We found it interesting 
to illustrate how rating process, rating-based data and methods should be disclosed 
and be made transparently. We will introduce the two concepts here, hidden 
information and hidden action, and later use the theory to illustrate why preventing 
hidden information and action is important in supervising the rating process and rating 
accuracy. That forms one way to regulate the CRAs.28 
 
                                                      
26 Hillier et al., 2011, p.585 
27 Hillier et al., 2011, p.161 
28 Douma & Schreuder, 1991, p.52 
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The reference we use for this part is from Sytse Douma and Hein Schreuder, and the 
name of the book is called ‘Economic Appraches to Organizations’. The latest edition is 
also one of the textbooks we use at Roskilde University in the Master of Economics and 
Business Administration. 
 
Hidden Information 
Hidden information refers to the situation ‘in which one party in a potential transaction 
is better informed about a relevant variable in the transaction than the other party.’ It 
is an ex ante information problem which happens before a business deal.29 
 
Douma and Schreuder used the example of health insurance to illustrate this 
phenomenon. A person especially an elder one who wants to buy a health insurance 
may have private information about how his/her health situation is or will be in a short 
time. Then there exists an information asymmetry before they get into a deal. This 
private information would lead to a potential transaction later and introduce risks for 
the other party, the insurance company, since they do not have the information. This 
will cause adverse selection in insurance companies. They may raise their standards or 
rates at which they pay for insurants, but it will make the insurance policies 
unattractive to the most average-risk groups and the other low-risk groups. One way to 
solve this problem, from the information holder’s side, is to disclose the information 
based on third-party’s supervision so as to increase information observability for both 
parties. Another method, from the counterparty, is to keep a unified and average 
standard for all the members.30 
 
Another example is when you buy a used car. The owner has more knowledge about 
the car and also has become aware of some potential problems maybe. Therefore, an 
information asymmetry develops. To solve this problem, we could also suggest the 
                                                      
29 Douma & Schreuder, 1991, p.54 
30 Douma & Schreuder, 1991, p.52-55 
 15 / 71 
information observability as the last one, like to have a professional and third-party 
verification. Despite, garages or insurers can provide a warranty and the seller should 
provide it for the buyer, Douma and Schreuder suggested. The warranty should cover 
or partly cover the risk for the buyer for a certain period, for instance three months, in 
case if the car is broken. This is the concept of risk segmentation which is to segment 
the risk and deal with it in separate ways.31 
 
Hidden Action 
Hidden action is another result of information asymmetry. Differing from hidden 
information, hidden action is an ex post phenomenon that occurs after the deal is 
made.32  
 
One example could be salesman. If a salesman works for a store and gets a fixed salary, 
the store would face risk since no matter how many he sells out, he gets the same 
amount of money. In order to prevent it, the book suggested a risk-sharing 
arrangement. The salesman always receives the same salary, and at the same time 
some bonus could work as incentive for his extra sales. So the store and the salesman 
share the risk.33  
 
Another aspect lies on the case of superior knowledge which creates the information 
asymmetry. An example could be patient and physician. Patient normally has no idea 
about what physician will do, step by step, and whether the actions are taken correctly 
or not. One way to get rid of this problem is to set up independent regulator to develop 
professional codes of conduct and review complaints.34 
 
In summary, hidden information and hidden action both have the problem of 
                                                      
31 Douma & Schreuder, 1991, p.54-55 
32 Douma & Schreuder, 1991, p.56 
33 Douma & Schreuder, 1991, p.57 
34 Douma & Schreuder, 1991, p.58 
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information asymmetry and unobservability. ‘If, at any time, all parties in a transaction 
are able to observe all the information they need to prepare and execute the 
transaction, both concepts would be irrelevant’.35 In case there is private information, 
the owner of the information has no incentive to disclose it since it will harm the 
owner’s private interest. The difference is that hidden information is an ex ante 
concept while hidden action is an ex post concept.36 
 
The methods on dealing with hidden information and hidden action would also work 
on the problems in the rating process. The analysis work before rating issued may 
contain hidden information (ex ante); and hidden action might exist after the rating is 
issued, in the supervision and update (ex post). The theory is going to explain the 
importance of information transparency and disclosure in the rating business. We will 
go into detail in the later chapters. 
 
 
2.3 Stakeholder Theory 
 
In this section, we explain the principle ideas of the stakeholder theory. We will refer to 
the works from R. Edward Freeman’s, who has mostly contributed to the development 
of the stakeholder theory.  
 
In his earliest work in 1983, Freeman with Reed distinguished two senses of 
stakeholder. From the narrow definition, stakeholder refers to ‘those groups who are 
vital to the survival and success of the corporation’. On the contrary, the wide 
definition defines stakeholder as ‘any group or individual who can affect or is affected 
by the corporation’. The principle of stakeholder theory is that ‘stakeholders may bring 
                                                      
35 Douma & Schreuder, 1991, p.58 
36 Douma & Schreuder, 1991, p.58 
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The forms of the ownerships differ a lot. A sole or partner ownership may have very 
few owners, and a listed company may have millions of shareholders. However owners 
have a probably similar stake to the corporation which is from the financial perspective. 
The owners expect some kind of financial return from the company they put their 
investment in.40 
 
Employees usually have their livelihood at stake with the corporation. They work for 
the company, contributing their professional skills and in return they expect salary, 
security, insurance and a good working environment etc.41 
 
Supplier is vital to the organization since it provides the raw materials for the 
organization and determines the final product’s quality and price. If supplier is treated 
as a stakeholder rather than simply a source of materials, it will provide the goods with 
proper quality and prices, and will be there as a long term partner. In return, the 
organization is the customer of the supplier and also is vital to the supplier’s survival.42 
 
Customers, the buyers of the organization’s products and therefore are the lifeblood of 
the firm since they bring the revenue to the firm. The earning is the source of the 
reinvestment, research & development and innovation of the firm. Customer is the key 
and the direct stakeholder to an organization’s rise or fall.43 
 
Local community is the base where the organization is built. It provides the right for a 
corporation to run, and the necessary facilities like the infrastructure around. In return, 
the corporation pays tax and makes contribution to the local economic development 
and employment rate etc.44 
                                                      
40 Freeman, 2004, p.42 
41 Freeman, 2004, p.42 
42 Freeman, 2004, p.43 
43 Freeman, 2004, p.43 
44 Freeman, 2004, p.43 
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Management is special, since on one hand it is a stake like the employees to the 
corporation, but on the other hand it is responsible to the overall status of the 
corporation, so to speak is in the role to keep the relationships among stakeholders in 
balance.45 
 
If considering stakeholder theory from the wide definition, we can also include 
competitors, government and etc.  
 
Savage et al. in 1991 gave a guideline to measure the variables and concluded four 
types of stakeholders: 
 
1. Supportive: high cooperative potential and low competitive threat. 
Considered as the ideal type and it includes the board of trustees, managers, 
employees, parent companies, suppliers, service providers and non-profit 
organizations. 
2. Marginal: low cooperative potential and competitive threat. 
Includes consumers’ interest groups, professional association for employees and 
shareholders. 
3. Non-supportive: low cooperative potential and high competitive threat. 
Includes competitors, unions, media and government. 
4. Mixed Blessing: high cooperative potential and competitive threat. 
Includes client and organizations with complimentary products and services. 
(Savage, 1991 & Fontaine et al., 2006, p.19-20) 
 
According to Savage’s four types of stakeholders, Freeman gave four strategies as 
respond to each of the types: 
 
                                                      
45 Freeman, 2004, p.44 
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1. Offensive Strategy, for the supportive group 
It includes trying to change stakeholder objectives or perceptions, to adopt the 
stakeholder position or to link the program to others that the stakeholder views 
more favorably. 
2. Hold Strategy, for the marginal group 
The company should hold its current position and continue current strategic 
program. 
3. Defensive Strategy, for the non-supportive group 
The objective is to prevent competitive threat on the part of these stakeholder. It 
means reinforcing current beliefs about the firm, maintaining existing programs or 
letting the stakeholder drive the integration process. 
4. Swing Strategy, for the mixed blessing group 
The firm has to take decisions such as changing the rules, the decision forum, the 
transaction process… 
(Freeman, 2004 & Fontaine et al., 2006, p.20) 
 
With regard to our research area, we would use the stakeholder theory to explain how 
the profiting model of CRAs causes the conflict of interests, and certain stakeholder’s 
benefit is neglected. Consequently, it will also help us to expound some possible 
methods on better regulating the way CRAs operate.  
 
 
2.4 Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) and Political CSR 
Theories 
 
Following the stakeholder theory, CSR was invented to show the aspect of how 
corporation should interact with their inside and outside stakeholders. And CSR, as 
specified, is very much seen as the ‘reputation capital’ or the reputational attraction to 
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the stakeholders.46 However, here we will mainly consider CSR from a point of view 
called Political CSR Theories. Its main standpoint is that CSR is not just an independent 
behaviour of philanthropy; it must reflect and be reflected by social relations and 
hierarchies, and government actions.47 To prove this, we use the article ‘Corporate 
Social Responsibility and Government’ written by Jeremy Moon, Nahee Kang and 
Jean-Pascal Gond as the main reference. The article is included in ‘The Oxford 
Handbook of Business and Government’ edited by David Coen, Wyn Grant and Graham 
Wilson. 
 
From the classical perspective, the CSR approaches were based on the framework of 
the new institutionalism which views CSR as ‘an institution of rules, regulations, 
established practices, and values and norms embedded in the historical trajectory and 
organizational structure of the polity and political economy.’48 From the start point, 
CSR was considered merely relevant to corporations which were then regarded to have 
the trait of citizenship. So to speak, corporations were responsible to the contribution 
of business and social development. As it develops, the role of CSR was getting 
increasingly important and starting to overlap with some of the government’s 
responsibilities, such as social welfare, healthcare services, education, employment etc. 
As long as CSR were getting more attention, the approaches also turned to be harder to 
get implemented independently of the government’s intervention and support.49 
 
Later then, Garriga and Melé classified the CSR theories into four categories: 
Instrumental CSR theories, Political CSR theories, Integrative CSR theories, and Ethical 
CSR theories.50 
 
Instrumental theories refer to the CSR’s contribution to the corporate performance and 
                                                      
46 Fontaine, et al., 2006, p.25 & Moon, et al., 2010, p.512 
47 Moon, et al., 2010, p.512 
48 Moon, et al., 2010, p.514 & Hall & Taylor, 1996 
49 Moon, et al., 2010, p.513 
50 Moon, et al., 2010, p.521 & Garriga & Melé, 2004 
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the maximization of shareholder value. Political CSR theories focus on the stressing of 
corporate power and the government-CSR relationships. Integrative CSR aims to 
integrate business and social relationships. And ethical theories define the moral 
fundamentals of CSR.51 
 
In our project, we will focus on the political CSR theories – particularly the 
government’s involvement in the CSR implementation, since we find it credible and 
reasonable to explain the credit crunch and to analyze the regulation of the rating 
agencies. A basic idea is that the government’s role is the prerequisite to the CSR 
implementation.  
 
Moon et al. concluded six types of the government-CSR relationships, based on the 
degree of government participation. It is a vertical order with government the least 
involved to the most involved in CSR activities. 
 
 
Relationship type Features 
1. CSR as self-government Corporate discretion independent of but alongside 
government (e.g., philanthropic contributions to society, 
business strategies for CSR) 
2. CSR as endorsed by 
government 
Governments encourage CSR through rhetoric and 
selective policies (e.g., governmental imprimatur, public 
procurement) 
3. CSR as facilitated by 
government 
Governments provide incentives for CSR (e.g. subsidies, 
tax expenditures) or allocate organizational resources 
4. CSR as a partnership 
with government 
Governments and business organizations (and often civil 
society) combine their resources and objectives 
5. CSR as mandated by 
government 
Governments regulate for CSR (e.g., to report their 
social, environmental, and ethical impacts) 
6. CSR as a form of 
government 
Firms act as if they were governments where there are 
government deficits (e.g., in pre-welfare state; 
                                                      
51 Moon, et al., 2010, p.521 
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post-privatization; global governance; new/’wicked’ 
issues) 
(Moon, et al., 2010, p.514) 
 
CSR in the US 
Even though the US is the birthplace of the CSR ideas, Moon et al. argued that in the 
US, CSR is still at the first level, ‘CSR as self-government’.52 Therefore the government’s 
emphasis on CSR must be improved because of its importance. There are four reasons 
from a socio-cultural perspective, as Moon et al. described, could explain this. First, 
‘CSR appeared to bridge the gap between private interests and the management of 
public good.’ It is ‘a third way between pure laissez-faire and state regulation.’53 
Second, ‘CSR was compatible with American traditions of democratic pluralism…’ Third, 
‘the notion of CSR drew on America’s moralist and Puritan traditions.’ And finally, ‘CSR 
reflected the utilitarian and pragmatic ideals of America.’54 
 
Although the ideas on CSR still remain fragmented, one tendency is common agreed 
that the importance of government regulation in CSR activities is all the way increasing. 
An approval of the failure in CSR regulating could be the credit crunch in the late 
financial crisis. So based on the CSR theories, we are going to use the CSR approaches 
to describe the failure of CSR implementation in the CRAs and the lack of government 
regulations, and therefore also to raise potential suggestions on better regulating the 
rating business. 
 
 
2.5 Macroeconomics 
 
Here we will briefly go through two contents under the classical macroeconomics, tax 
                                                      
52 Moon, et al., 2010, p.516 
53 Moon, et al., 2010, p.516, 519 
54 Moon, et al., 2010, p.514 
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and competition, which are relevant to our later discussion. They are both big research 
areas; however we will not go into details and here only talk about some main points 
that will support our analysis in regulating the CRAs in the following chapter.  
 
2.5.1  Tax  
 
We tend to discuss in what situation is tax preferable, and how to tax fairly. Primarily, it 
is preferred to use tax rather than charges when the expenditure is of the public 
responsibility. In case when private charging is impossible to implement, it raises the 
importance of government action. Or in any situation if it is undesirable to evaluate 
how much benefit any one individual derives from certain public services, like 
education, defence, healthcare etc., it is preferable to use tax.55 
 
When discussing how to tax fairly, we found two principles: ability to pay, and benefits 
principle. Ability to pay refers to ‘take proportionately more from the rich than from 
the poor’, such as income tax. Benefits principle argues that ‘people who get more 
than their share of public spending should pay more than their share of tax revenues’, 
such as the taxes for car users.56 
 
The above points on tax, we would like to use to support some methods on regulating 
the credit rating process. For instance, to tax the users both issuers and investors in 
order to make every stakeholder pay for the ratings and best avoid the conflict of 
interests. We get back to this later. 
 
2.5.2  Oligopoly and Competition  
 
In an industry with very few competitors is what you know as oligopoly. An oligopoly 
                                                      
55 Prest, 1960, p.33 
56 Begg, 2006, p.172 
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has a relatively high entry barrier, since collusion could be taken place among the few 
oligopoliers. ‘Collusion is an explicit or implicit agreement between existing firms to 
avoid competition’. This behaviour could make new entry less likely.57 
 
On the contrary, sufficient competition to the market is more healthy and efficient. ‘A 
competitive strategy reflects the firm’s choices concerning the strategic dimensions of 
its industry.’ In this case many competitive strategies could be possible, among which 
two strategies are mostly identified: cost leadership and product differentiation – in 
another word, price and quality / function.58 
 
In the credit rating business, we have seen that it is more or less an oligopoly. Although 
there are a number of authorized rating agencies, the market is to a big extent 
occupied by two big players, the Moody’s and the Standard & Poor with more than 80% 
of the market share. So based on the concept of competition, we are to come up with 
some advice to avoid the oligopoly and entry barrier, and to achieve more competition 
in the industry in order to increase the accuracy of the ratings and benefit the 
investors. 
 
 
2.6 Summary 
 
We hereby have discussed all the theories we would like to use in our project. Each of 
them has their own relevance related to the following descriptive and analytical works.  
 
First of all, Financial Investment Behaviours will help us to initiate the background 
description, about how by habit people make investment decisions and what errors 
commonly exist in this process. The biases might lead people to get trapped into the 
                                                      
57 Begg, 2006, p.121 
58 Douma & Schreuder, 1991, p.128-129 
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final crisis despite the warning beforehand. The behaviour of looking at the credit 
ratings could be one of the heuristics of people’s decision making process.  
 
The other theories, from different angles, explain the problems in the rating agencies, 
the business process and the government supervision. Economics of information 
provides the ideas to look at the problem on information transparency. For instance, 
hidden or uncompleted information disclosure may mislead the market and the 
investors. Stakeholder theory tends to look at the problem from the relationships 
between CRAs and issuers, CRAs and investors etc. which indicates a popular issue 
being widely discussed – the conflicts of interest in the CRAs. CSR and the political CSR 
theories, from a broader sense, consider the problems of CRAs in the context of 
macroeconomic control and government participation, as same as the illustration on 
tax and competition. In summary, these theories will support our ideas and proposals 
on better regulating the rating process and the business. In the following chapters, we 
will gradually dig into these analyses. 
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3 Methodology 
 
 
The scientific approach chosen for this study is a case study method. We will be 
concentrating towards ‘the collective case study where a number of cases studied in 
order to investigate some general phenomenon’.59 A case study is an empirical inquiry 
where multiple sources of evidence used, investigates phenomenon within its real-life 
context. The advantage of this approach is its ability to deal a full variety of evidence 
such as documents, article etc. 
 
We will apply a funnel approach to conduct the analysis using the process of deduction, 
by leading the analysis from general to the particular observation, almost as if one 
moved through a funnel, until the finalized statement is put onto paper. Therefore it 
will be a deductive model. 
 
By studying the writings of others, we can sharpen our understanding of any given 
situation, which in turn allows us to ask relevant research questions. When we have 
decided upon research questions, we can select data that will help us answer those 
questions. By applying our volume for reasoning and our chosen theories to the data 
we have selected. It becomes possible for us to analyze our subject. That can lead us to 
a conclusion on our problem formulation. 
 
 
3.1 Theoretical Approach 
 
We start by defining our main analytical angle with respect to our problem formulation. 
We will be using several theories which were found to be relevant for the project. Our 
                                                      
59 Silverman, 2000, p.126 
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theoretical approach is built upon interdisciplinary perspectives in relation to our 
problem formulation. 
 
We will use economics of information (hidden information; hidden action) to illustrate 
how rating process, rating-based data and methods should be disclosed and be made 
transparent. Also preventing hidden information is a good way for an independent 
institution to supervise the rating process and accuracy, which is one of the ways to 
regulate CRA. 
 
Stakeholder theory will be used to explain how issuer-pays model would cause the 
conflict of interest in the rating process. We also consider looking at a Corporate Social 
Responsibility (CSR) and governments role in CSR implementation, whereas 
macroeconomic considerations will also be taken into account. 
 
 
3.2 Data Selection 
 
Our data selection is influenced by some factors that were mentioned in the limitation 
chapter. A secondary source such as public institutions, libraries, universities have 
played a significant role in gathering information and gives more time to analyze and 
interpret data. The data contain information required to answer that is now both 
implicit and explicit part of the present project we believe that the secondary data we 
use in our case analysis is sufficiently reliable, academically liable. With this one in 
mind we will have our own understanding and interpretation of it. 
 
Most of our empirical materials we choose are produced by American scholars and 
institutions. The background description part material is taken from the secondary 
materials, such as academic published books and research papers. 
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‘The description part mostly involved the work of ESSEC Economics Professor Patricia 
Langohr, who with her father, INSEAD Finance and Banking Professor Herwig Langohr, 
has written a book, called ‘The rating agencies and their credit ratings’60 that 
publication provides accurate and authoritative information. The book provides the 
whole spectrum of a capital market where it may be useful to the financial executives 
as well as investors. That book discusses the role of the CRA both from the historical 
and present perspectives, where they focus towards the variety of issues such as: 
credit rating process, the leading firms and their methodological approach.61 
 
Robert W. Kolb, (Loyola University Chicago, Professor of Finance, Frank W. Considine 
Chair of Applied Ethics) in the book called ‘The Financial Crisis of Our Time’,62 offers a 
history of the housing finance system as it developed throughout the twentieth century. 
The book gives a description of the crisis as it developed and analyzes all of the 
participants in the housing market. That book illustrates the historically studied events 
in relation to the financial crisis of our time.63 
 
‘Rawi Abdelal is the Professor of Business Administration at Harvard Business School’.64 
In his book ‘Capital Rules. The Construction of Global Finance’, mainly focuses towards 
the fundamentals of the globalization in the financial markets. Freedom for capital 
movements became the new orthodoxy. He describes the US American banker’s ways 
of handling their business where they mainly promote multilateral, liberal rules for 
global finance.65 
 
Professor Stéphane Rousseau of the Université de Montréal created an article called 
                                                      
60 http://knowledge.insead.edu/finance-credit-ratings-090824.cfm?vid=295 
61 http://www.docin.com/p-56515950.html  foreword p. 9-11 
62 http://www.robertwkolb.com/Robert%20W.%20Kolb--Curriculum%20Vitae.pdf 
63 http://ukcatalogue.oup.com/product/9780199730551.do 
64 http://hbswk.hbs.edu/faculty/rabdelal.html 
65http://books.google.dk/books?id=DzEEVw2yIwwC&printsec=frontcover&dq=inauthor:%22Rawi+Abdelal%22&hl=d
a&sa=X&ei=39PBT6euO4fatAaLz-3WCg&ved=0CD0Q6AEwAQ#v=onepage&q=inauthor%3A%22Rawi%20Abdelal%22
&f=false  preface p. 9-11 
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‘Enhancing the Accountability of Credit Rating Agencies, The Case for a 
Disclosure-Based Approach’.66 It basically focuses towards the authoritative way of 
functioning within the CRA, where they have gained considerable influential power in 
the financial market structure. Most of their power is based on the trust and 
reputational capital that plays a driving force for the CRA working process. CRA still 
remain unregulated private institutions. The article focuses on pointing out the 
unregulated problems within the CRA industry and their failure in accountability 
towards issuers and investors. It also suggests the implementation of the IOSCO Code 
of Conduct through a disclosure strategy. And presents some other regulative 
measures in relation to CRA actions such as: The Securities and Exchange Commission, 
The International Organization of Securities Commission / the Code of Conduct 
Fundamentals for Credit Rating Agencies.67 
 
 
3.3 Ontology 
 
According to Gerard Delanty, ‘the knowledge of Social Science provides a mediated 
knowledge; it is a mediation of science and reality. Constructivists maintain that social 
reality is not something outside the discourse of science but is partly is constituted by 
science’68 It is a philosophical belief that we as human beings have a tendencies to 
interpret our own understanding of reality. Thus it is believed that the creation of 
meaning is closely related to our surroundings that construct our realities. 
 
‘CRAs have predispositions in privatization policy in a form of emerging private 
authority. A constructivist approach to the global finance examines the distinctiveness 
of particular events, institutions, and ways of thinking, and seeks to interpret and 
                                                      
66 http://www.prefblog.com/?p=1904 
67 http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=797325 
68 Delanty, 2005, p.136-137 
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demonstrate their significance.’69 
 
With it we will be able to discuss financial institutions by focusing towards two main 
actors of our project – two credit rating agencies Moody’s and Standard & Poor’s 
during financial crisis period in the United States. 
 
 
3.4 Epistemology 
 
‘Reflexivity refers to a self-transformative capacity…it arises out of the relational 
encounter of subjectivity with objectivity.’70 It occurs in social systems in relation to an 
actor’s observation and realization of own action which results in consequence and 
modification of own behavior. For example an investor who makes trades that adjust 
the price is engaged in a reflexive process. 
 
However in relation to our project we will be mainly engaged in Tim Mays critical 
nature of reflexivity in social science called ‘referential reflexivity is a critical reflexivity 
aimed at identifying the effects of power on social action leading to an enhanced 
potential for self-transformation.’71 The knowledge of production and reception come 
together that’s where reflexivity depends on information sponginess between 
disciplines. Where financial behavior in return emphasize limits on rational behavior. 
 
‘Rating agencies, acting as embedded knowledge networks, can be thought to adjust 
the “ground rules” inside international capital markets and thereby shape the internal 
organization and behavior of institutions seeking funds…What is central to the status 
and consequentiality of rating agencies is what people believe about them, and act on 
                                                      
69 Sinclair, 2010, p.424-425 
70 Delanty, 2005, p.120 
71 Delanty, 2005, p.123 
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collectively – even if those beliefs are clearly false.’72 
 
In our project we will be focusing towards CRA role in rating processes their part in 
influencing investor’s decision and as a consequence resulting in financial crisis and 
provide better ways in regulating CRA processes. By gaining knowledge based on facts 
we will be able to address those issues with a usage of our theories. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                      
72 Sinclair, 2010, p.427-428 
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4 Background and Analysis 
 
 
4.1 Background 
 
During times 2001-2006 the mortgage market was booming that’s where US mortgage 
market made explosive profits in prime and subprime market. CRA function was to 
asses’ quality of debt securities based on the mortgage market, (during those years 
everybody was getting rich). CRA role is to assess the likelihood of the principal in the 
interest rates of the debt paid back in the timely fashion. They are neutral and credible, 
and evaluate the quality of the product. Credit rating agencies must evaluate and grade 
the firm in the form of rating. Assess the level of poor performance of the company 
that might lead to financial distress. ‘They estimate the likelihood that a 
well-performing firm may try to walk away from its dues, and they must assess 
correctly the ability and willingness of a distressed firm to resolve its problems 
privately with creditors or file for bankruptcy.’73 According to US Credit Rating Agency 
Reform Act of 2006, ‘The term “credit rating” means an assessment of the 
creditworthiness of an obligor as an entity or with respect to specific securities or 
money market instruments.’74 
 
The credit rating world is surely a busy place. ‘More than 745 000 securities from over 
42 000 issuers, and representing at least $30 trillion, are rated from AAA or P-1 through 
C by about 150 different CRAs spanning over 100 countries.’75 
 
‘The Current Structure of the Industry is that there is currently about 150 local and 
international CRAs around the world, up from approximately 130 in 2000. The major 
                                                      
73 Langohr, 2010, p.39 
74 Langohr, 2010, p.31 
75 Langohr, 2010, p.31 
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US agencies have all established operations and joint ventures abroad to meet the 
globalization of capital markets, and the increasing importance of credit ratings in 
markets outside the US’.76 
 
Two of the largest CRA Moody’s and S&P have their own definition of credit rating 
process ‘According to Moody’s It is an assessment of the ability and willingness of an 
issuer of fixed-income securities to make full and timely payment of amounts due on 
the security over its life. A credit rating is S&P opinion of the general creditworthiness 
of an obligor, or the creditworthiness of an obligor with respect to a particular debt 
security or other financial obligation, based on relevant risk factors.’ From Moody’s 
perception they basically deal with an independent view over the credit risk and an 
obligators enthusiasm in taking care of their responsibilities. As for S&P their rating 
deal is interrelated with creditworthiness of an issuer as well as opinions grounded on 
relevant risk factors77 
 
Moody’s and S&P are in control for over 90% of the market for sovereign debt rating. 
‘The agencies sovereign ratings indirectly affect every other bond rating in the world 
because of so-called sovereign ceiling: the agencies almost never rate a domestic firm’s 
foreign-currency debt higher than its government because of the risk of a sovereign 
imposing foreign exchange controls.’78 In those analyses they are accountable in 
determining the best policies that will improve country’s economic performance and as 
a result will increase its capacity to repay loan. According to behavioral finance CRAs 
were raised up to that important position in the form of Framing Effects, which refers 
to the frame dependence individuals have when making different decisions, depending 
on how question or problem is framed. 
 
‘Moody’s and S&P must interpret the signals sent by governments’ policies and guess 
                                                      
76 Langohr, 2010, p.384 
77 Langohr, 2010, p 32 
78 Abdelal, 2007, p.162-165 
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what the markets will infer as well, taking into account, of course, that their own rating 
changes will influence market sentiment’.79 CRA had been given the authority by 
governments that liberalized them as well as market participants which pass on power 
towards them in relation to their creditworthiness and reputation.80 
 
‘The highest rating a firm’s debt can have is AAA or Aaa, and such debt is judged to be 
the best quality and to have the lowest degree of risk…debt rated D is in default, and 
payment of interest and/or repayment of principal is in arrears’. 81  Ratings are 
expressed as letter grades that sort from ‘AAA’ to ‘D’ 
 
No doubt that each agency uses their own methods in acquiring the rate in estimating 
creditworthiness. CRA role is permitting corporations and governments to make money 
on in capital market level by providing accurate and widely recognized measure of 
credit risk.82 
 
‘Investors and other market participants may use the ratings as a screening device to 
match the relative credit risk of an issuer or individual debt issue with their own risk 
tolerance or credit risk guidelines in making investment and business decisions’83 
 
‘The roughly 4500 professionals it employs on an industry basis tend to rank at the 
right end of the IQ scale and are unusually well trained and analytically skilled (be it in 
law, science, economics, accounting, or finance) knowledge workers…strong cognitively, 
they want a rating to be right rather than to sell it, and to have it adhering to global 
company standards rather than adapting these to local cultures’.84 
 
                                                      
79 Abdelal, 2007, p.162-165 
80 Abdelal, 2007, p.162-165 
81 Hiller et al., 2011, p.159-160 
82 Pdf. S&P, p.5 
83 Pdf. S&P, p.5 
84 Langohr, 2010, p.375 
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‘S&P has its roots from 1860, when Henry Varnum Poor published his History of 
Railroads and Canals in the United States, later Standard Statistics Company published 
its first rating publication in 1922…Today Credit Market Services is part of the Financial 
Services division of S&P’s parent company McGraw-Hill, which provides financial 
services related to equities, including the development and management of 
benchmark equity indices known throughout the world, and independent equity and 
mutual fund research…also provides valuation advisory services, credit analysis, and 
exposure management products, investor education, and data services through its 
subsidiary Capital IQ.’85 
 
‘Moody’s describes itself today as an essential component of the global capital markets. 
John Moody (1868–1958) laid the foundations in 1900 for what is now Moody’s 
Investors Service, when he published Moody’s Manual of Industrial and Corporation 
Securities...By 1924 Moody’s ratings covered nearly 100% of the US bond 
market…Today, Moody’s Corporation is a publicly traded company, listed on the New 
York Stock Exchange since September 30, 2000… Moody’s Corporation is now the 
parent company of Moody’s Investors Services, Moody’s KMV, and Moody’s 
Economy.com...Moody’s provides services in fixed income securities markets, including 
credit ratings and investor-oriented credit research (including in-depth research on 
major issuers, industry studies, special comments, and credit opinion handbooks) 
provided through Moody’s Investor Services.’86 
 
On the governmental level a security exchange commission was organized, their role 
was to protect investors, maintain fair, orderly and efficient markets, and facilitate 
capital formation.87 ‘During the financial crisis SEC report indicated that agencies 
typically did not have written policies about how to rate this securities, had difficulties 
in adapting to the increased volume and complexity of the new instruments they were 
                                                      
85 Langohr, 2010, p.392 
86 Langohr, 2010, p.394-397 
87 Kolb, 2011, p.170 
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rating, made adjustments to the rating that were inconsistent with their own 
quantitative models, and that they lacked policies and procedures to identify, address, 
and correct errors in their methods and their quantitative models’.88 
 
‘In 1975 the SEC designated some firms as Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating 
Organizations (NRSROs). As SEC notes, ratings by NRSRO today are used as benchmarks 
in federal and state legislation, rules issued by financial and other regulators, foreign 
regulatory schemes, and private financial contracts. Many of these uses specifically 
refer to the term NRSRO as used in the Commission’s rules and regulations’.89 
According to CRA reform act 2006, the SEC had had a modest oversight authority, they 
may define CRA, write recommendations however they cannot get involved in their 
credit rating methods, or how they do their business. 
 
‘Many argue that Moody’s and S&P together represent one of the most powerful 
groups in the international financial markets…there is no doubt that Moody’s and S&P 
have built strong brand names and are seen as the pace-setters in the industry’.90 
 
CRA also change people's habit when making investment decisions in a Heuristics way. 
Which is the instinct in making decisions, that is defined as ‘shortcuts or rules of thumb 
used to make decisions’. From market participant perspective before buying the rating 
you cannot rely on quality of prediction. There could be general reasoning behind the 
methods used in rating prediction. Generally most of the users of ratings have a belief 
with regards to the quality of a rating. Those beliefs have roots in agencies reputational 
capital. This is where a reputation is a vital competitive advantage that agency needs to 
build. The value of rating depends on a reputation over the rating agency. Whereas 
many investors tend to believe well-known credit rating agencies that have a long term 
history in respect to the rating abilities. ‘How investors perceive the quality (accuracy 
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of estimate) of a rating determines the benefit of that rating to the issuer’.91 
 
During the pre-financial crisis time investors behavior at that time can only be interpret 
as bias which leads most of them to bad financial decision making, where 
overconfidence, over-optimism towards ratings that CRA had issued played a key role 
in their decision makings. Investors must interpret a rating into the types of risks they 
are willing to take. Where in return would like to understand what they are buying and 
where they invest their money to. Most of the investors are keen towards the business 
that they understand or familiar with. Track record of institution, market incentive 
makes most of the investors to stick with a well-known agency. CRA give a common 
language to investors in their decision making process in relation to interpret a credit 
risk. ‘So for a given agency’s reputation, the more widely its ratings are used and 
accepted by market participants, the greater the utility of its ratings to investors, and 
therefore issuers… issuers will value the ratings of companies that investor’s value. This 
is merely a trust relationship’.92 
 
CRA signify a privatized authority in the world economy, where the dominant key 
players Moody’s and S&P are seen as a private firms dominating the market (oligopoly 
market structure), ‘in theory of the principals for which Moody’s and S&P are the 
agents, has been profound as long as such credit has existed.’93 However their 
credibility was a key in providing public services where trust and creditworthiness 
matter. 
 
 
4.2 Problems in the Rating Business 
 
‘CRAs ratings may constitute valuable information in that they tend to be self-fulfilling 
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prophecies…they also convey information about the entity’s borrowing costs as well as 
the marketability of the debt that is issued.’94 ‘Many CRA were exploding their 
regulatory licenses, they were able to amass profits over and above those that they 
could have earned without a regulatory license, so these excess profits came at the 
expense of society at large’.95 
 
There are some main problems in CRA that should be regulated: Information 
transparency; Timeliness/ monitoring; competition; conflicts of interest; accountability 
gap 
 
Information Transparency 
The information asymmetries exist in the capital market mainly between issuers and 
investors, where CRA role in the process is to resolve some information asymmetries by 
playing a neutral entity and giving an accurate rating. ‘Inevitably information 
asymmetry exists in the debt market because issuers have superior information 
regarding their creditworthiness than do investors…this discrepancy enables issuers to 
exaggerate their credit quality in order to get the highest price for their securities, 
leaving to potential investors the task of distinguishing between good and bad issues’. 
This problem cannot be left uncheck it may lead to opposed results where good quality 
debt issues may be undervalued with that damaging the sustainability of the market. A 
lot of issuers are interested in getting the highest rating grade, which gives them an 
opportunity to receive the highest possible price for their issue from investors. ‘Issuers 
that have good credit quality can communicate this information to investors and 
receive higher market valuation, through actions that issuers of lower credit quality 
find too costly to reproduce.’96 
 
According to the economics of information preventing hidden information and action is 
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important in supervising the rating process and rating accuracy. Do doubt there will 
always be a problem in information asymmetry. Hidden information process happens 
ex ante before a business deal. It could be the information accuracy that issuer provide 
CRA. Hidden action is a result of information asymmetry, an ex post phenomenon that 
occurs after the deal is made. That’s when investor needs to make a right decision in 
choosing a good issue. CRA staff is ought to check on the information, have an 
adequate document review. CRA should not take issuers words on what it was on those 
assets; they must monitor or look toughly over the information. 
 
Ratings are evaluation of the creditworthiness of issuers. They have been less reliable 
as indicators of credit risk. It appears that ‘default probabilities associated with the 
specific letter ratings have drifted over time.’97 
 
Timeliness / Monitoring 
After the rating issuance ‘CRA maintain surveillance of the issuer or its securities 
following the rating through contact with management and access to publicly disclosed 
information.’ Many of CRA had been criticized for lack of surveillance and monitoring of 
assigned rating. ‘That fact suggests that CRAs do not invest sufficient effort in 
monitoring ratings once they are assigned…the agencies lag behind the market when it 
comes to reviewing the creditworthiness of the issuers’.98 There could be a lot of 
different reasons behind the lack of surveillance, for example CRA are paid to do the 
rating but not surveillance. CRA lose their credibility by being ignorant and misjudging 
the risk factor. 
 
Imperfect Competition 
‘The most successful era has benefited from oligopoly market structure which is 
reinforced by regulations that depend exclusively on credit ratings issued by NRSRO 
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this market power gave rating agencies an important role in the securitization of 
mortgages and other financial instruments, because of the each of the newly created 
securities required a rating from NRSRO.’99 
 
At the international level, the IOSCO reports that Moody’s and S&P and Fitch dominate 
the credit rating business. They have an oligopoly market structure where there are 
barriers in entering the market. 
 
First barrier stems from existing regulatory framework. ‘An indirect implication is that 
new entrants are prevented from acting as raters for a significant number of 
issuers…this in turn bars emerging agencies from attaining a level of business whose 
scope will be sufficiently broad to warrant NRSRO recognition’. Issuers will prefer a 
well-known with best reputation rating agencies that have NRSRO status. The second 
barrier to entry ‘stems from the market itself, and is based on the economies of scale 
and scope, as well as standardizations that are present in the rating industry…the 
dominant CRA may be tempted to engage in anticompetitive behavior to restrain entry 
into market and maintain their position.’100 
 
Conflict of Interests 
The current business model of CRA is an issuer pay model, which leads to potential 
conflict of interest. With it many CRA generate their revenues at the expense of issuers. 
‘The practice of issuers paying for their own ratings creates a potential conflict of 
interests for CRA…agencies may be tempted to downplay the credit risk of issuers and 
to inflate their ratings in order to retain their business.’101 
 
Nowadays most of CRA have consulting services that fact creates another potential 
conflict of interests. ‘The rating decision may be influenced by whether or not an issuer 
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purchases additional service offered by a CRA...issuers may feel the need to subscribe 
to such services simply out of fear that their failure to do so could adversely impact 
their credit rating.’102 
 
Lack of Regulation 
However, CRA gained an influentially enormous power in financial markets, it’s nearly 
impossible to hold them responsible for their actions. First of all it is difficult for issuers 
and investors to walk away with CRAs given the current regulatory use of ratings. And 
second, reputation is a key in CRA device that had been built over the years. ‘There 
appears to be an accountability gap, which constitutes an imbalance between the 
power of CRAs and the possibility of holding them responsible.’103 CRA give rating to 
the private organization with this one there is no price transparency over the product 
whereas issuer pay model gives incentives to issuers select agency that gives more 
favorable ratings. 
 
 
4.3 IOSCO Statement of Principles and Code of Conduct 
 
IOSCO is the abbreviation of International Organization of Securities Commissions. Its 
main function is to set internationalized rules for virtual financial products like equities, 
securities, options and other financial-related goods. Credit rating has been included in 
its regulation as it was getting to be attracting. According to the IOSCO’s ‘Objectives 
and Principles of Securities Regulation’, the core objectives of IOSCO are ‘protecting 
investors, ensuring that securities markets are fair, efficient, and transparent, and 
reducing systemic risk.’104 CRA, as independent institution on information analysis and 
release should contribute to these objectives. 
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 43 / 71 
Since rating agencies can be accepted by the market if they act to be credible and 
reliable, the Technical Committee of IOSCO has concluded the principles ‘regarding the 
activities of CRAs’ and the Code of Conduct. These documents have been frequently 
referred to by the securities regulators from the US, Europe and etc. to form up their 
own legal rules.105 
 
In this section, we are going to introduce these two important materials which have 
had a very positive influence on the regulation of the activities of CRAs, the ‘Statement 
of Principles Regarding the Activities of Credit Rating Agencies’ and the ‘Code of 
Conduct Fundamentals for Credit Rating Agencies’. 
 
Statement of Principles 
 
The statement of principles is laid out with the objectives to ‘improve investor 
protection and the fairness, efficiency and transparency of the securities markets and 
reduce systemic risk.’106 The principles are just the guideline to achieve the core 
objectives of securities regulation; therefore, are not limited as the form stated. It is 
not a ‘one-size-first-all’ approach. Each market should consider its own circumstances 
legal foundations in order to implement its own mechanism under which the CRA 
operates.107 
 
The principles include four chapters, each with a regulatory orientation.  
 
 
1. Quality and Integrity of the Rating Process 
‘CRAs should endeavor to issue opinions that help reduce the asymmetry of 
information among borrowers, lenders and other market participants.’ 
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2. Independence and Conflicts of Interest 
‘CRA ratings decisions should be independent and free from political or economic 
pressures and from conflicts of interest arising due to the CRA’s ownership 
structure, business or financial activities, or the financial interests of the CRA’s 
employees. CRAs should, as far as possible, avoid activities, procedures or 
relationships that may compromise or appear to compromise the independence 
and objectivity of the credit rating operations.’ 
3. Transparency and Timeliness of Ratings Disclosure 
‘CRAs should make disclosure and transparency an objective in their rating 
activities.’ 
4. Confidential Information 
‘CRAs should maintain in confidence all non-public information communicated to 
them by any issuer, or its agents, under the terms of a confidentiality agreement or 
otherwise under a mutual understanding that the information is shared 
confidentially.’ 
(Source: IOSCO, 2003, p.2-4) 
 
Each aspect has sub articles. We will get back to use these, as well as those in the Code 
of Conduct, in the next chapter. 
 
Code of Conduct 
 
In 2004, one year after the Statement of Principles was published, IOSCO developed ‘a 
more specific and detailed code of conduct giving guidance on how the Principles could 
be implemented in practice’, according to suggests from commenters as well as some 
CRAs.108 The purpose of the Code of Conduct is to ‘promote investor protection by 
safeguarding the integrity of the rating process.’109 IOSCO suggested that the Code of 
Conduct should be adopted by CRAs in order to have their own Code Fundamentals 
regardless of the different types of market mechanisms, business models, legal 
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circumstances and etc.110 The code of conduct was updated in 2008, so in our project 
we are going to refer to the new version.  
 
The Code of Conduct contains four big categories, developed from but based on that in 
the Statement of Principles. Each category is divided further into different topics which 
are also explained more in detail in sub articles. The main categories are: 
 
1. Quality and Integrity of the Rating Process 
a) Quality of the Rating Process 
b) Monitoring and Updating 
c) Integrity of the Rating Process 
2. CRA Independence and Avoidance of Conflicts of Interest 
a) General 
b) CRA Procedures and Policies 
c) CRA Analyst and Employee Independence 
3. CRA Responsibilities to the Investing Public and Issues 
a) Transparency and Timeliness of Ratings Disclosure 
b) The Treatment of Confidential Information 
4. Disclosure of the Code of Conduct and Communication with Market Participants 
(Source: IOSCO, 2008, Code of Conduct, p.4-13) 
 
The first three categories are very much based on the guideline of the Statement of 
Principles. The fourth part is new regarding how CRA develops its own code of conduct 
based on the IOSCO one and discloses it to the public. 
 
The IOSCO Statement of Principles and the Code of Conduct are very important in our 
analysis on how to regulate the CRAs. We are going to refer to some specific articles 
with regard to the regulatory proposals in the next chapter. If you want to learn the 
completed contents of the Principles and the Code of Conduct, please look at the 
Appendixes attached after the project papers. 
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4.4 Stakeholder Analysis 
 
Before going into the regulatory proposals, it is necessary to do a stakeholder analysis 
regarding the CRAs. We believe it is important for the next step since many proposals 
are strongly related to the stakeholder structure of the CRAs. 
 
According to Freeman’s narrow definition of stakeholder, a corporation has six main 
types of stakeholders: Management, Owners, Suppliers, Employees, Customers and 
Local Community. When we look at the CRA problems, we find that the stakeholder 
definition by the narrow sense has a big limitation. 
 
We focus on the bias here. For instance, the biggest stake-group with the largest 
number of population, investors, is ignored. Owners are the shareholders of the 
company and therefore must be the investors. On the other hand, investors are not 
necessarily the owners. Sometimes they are merely the users of the ratings, which are 
known as the free-riders. Anyway, we define both of them as investors, and their 
interest is actually ignored. This, as we already know, is the problem of the Conflicts of 
Interest. It is not something new since many studies have already lain on it.111  
 
The stakeholder who has got more attention is the customers, or issuers to be specified, 
in the rating business. The profitable way of CRAs is also known as the issuer-pays 
model, in which issuers pay for the ratings. In this case, it is important for CRAs to meet 
the customers’ need, to give a rating as high as possible. And this is the root of many 
ensuing problems. To this degree, we could see that the management doesn’t work 
properly on balancing the interests among stakeholders. According to Freeman, 
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‘management, especially top management, must look after the health of the 
corporation, and this involves balancing the multiple claims of conflicting 
stakeholders…management must keep the relationships among stakeholders in 
balance.’112 
 
Therefore, we argue that the stakeholder management should be done based on the 
perspective of the wide definition. This includes some main aspects. First, CRAs should 
reconsider those investors who are free-riders at the moment. According to the wide 
definition, stakeholders include ‘any group or individual who can affect or is affected by 
the corporation’.113 The investors are the largest group of the stakeholder who can 
affect but more obviously is affected by the CRAs. By the narrow definition, the 
free-riders of the investors are not included in the stakeholders, and that’s the reason 
we said at the beginning – the narrow sense has a big limitation. Here we argue that 
the free-riders as well as the whole investor group should be more involved in the 
stakeholders since their interest is poorly protected. Of course, it is not only the CRAs’ 
responsibility to achieve this. 
 
Another aspect is the governmental or institutional regulation, which is also contained 
only in the wide definition of stakeholder. Let’s call it third-party regulation. To a 
certain extent, this kind of stakeholder plays a management role, in balancing the 
interests among other stakeholders. And this might be quite important in the 
contemporary rating business. 
 
In addition, the role of competitors forms another wide-defined stakeholder. The 
critique on the competitive status in the rating business is still a new topic, but also 
very convincible. The raise of more competitors may have a positive stimulation to 
solve the problems on conflicts of interest, information transparency and etc.  
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The stakeholder analysis is an important preparation for the later discussion. In one 
word, we are going to look further into some main aspects of the regulatory proposals 
related to the rating business regarding the stakeholder relationship. 
 
 
4.5 Summary 
 
Above the summary, we have four sections in this chapter. Background introduced the 
development of the financial market as well as the CRAs in the US. Followed by the 
problems in the rating business which turned to focus on the CRAs regarding to some 
main problems and critiques in this business area. The close attention started from, 
especially the recent financial crisis, around 2006. The description of the background 
and the problems led out the regulations on this business. IOSCO, for instance, tried to 
provide the principles and the code of conduct for the rating business. The articles 
sounds sweet but unfortunately they could not prevent the CRAs from being 
denounced by the public regarding their loss during the financial crisis. Most problems 
still exist. At last, we also did a stakeholder analysis. We briefly mapped the 
stakeholders of the rating agencies and emphasized on the most disputed ones relating 
to the conflicts of interest. It has been widely argued that the interests among the 
stakeholders, especially that between issuers/customers and public investors, are not 
equally treated or managed.  
 
The chapter as a whole delineates the general status quo of the rating business and the 
agencies, focusing on the problems of the rating process, the conflicts of interest and 
how to implement the IOSCO statement of principles and the code of conduct, and etc. 
We are going to, based on these issues, come up with some possible ways to help 
regulating the rating business and the agencies in the next chapter. 
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5 Regulatory Proposals 
 
 
We have generally described the business model and the problems in the CRAs. We 
have also discussed the IOSCO statement of principles and the code of conduct which 
play a positive function in regulating the rating business. We are going to refer to some 
articles regarding the better regulation of dos and don’ts. Besides, we also did a 
stakeholder analysis on CRAs, primarily about the conflicts of interest between issuers 
and investors. Conflict of interest, as defined in the problems, is a big dispute. And it is 
a main aspect we are going to talk about in the following proposals. 
 
Based on the Economics of Information, information asymmetry occurs in the ex ante 
hidden information and the ex post hidden action. That is an interesting reminding for 
us in relation to the regulations on CRAs. We can also divide the proposals based on 
the periods before ratings are issued and after they are issued. Here we name them as 
Pre-rating period and Post-rating period. We are going to classify the proposals into 
some main categories under the two periods. Besides, we also have Third-party 
Regulation (also known as government / institution intervention) which is an 
independent topic and could be implemented through the whole business process. The 
CSR approaches will be involved in this category to demonstrate how important 
third-party or government’s role in the regulations is. Put onto the stakeholder theory, 
if government is involved as a stakeholder by wider definition, it is much more obvious 
for the rating business that the CRAs even rate the government bonds and etc. If 
without proper regulation, inaccurate ratings may harm the national financial stability, 
Greece for instance.  
 
In addition to that, we would also like to tell beforehand that the proposals are 
integrated by some of the other scholars’ ideas and views, our own suggestions and 
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also some new ideas modified from the existing proposals.114 We conclude, what we 
think, the more practical and effective proposals, based on our knowledge of the rating 
business and the agencies. The sources are from the scholars who are professional in 
the studies of the American economics and the financial market for CRAs. However, the 
most ones are our own proposals. And in order to support our ideas, we use the IOSCO 
Code of Conduct as the main source. It is an international regulation, however are also 
quite connected to the US rating market.  
 
 
5.1 Pre-rating 
 
Pre-rating concept defines the regulatory proposals before the ratings are issued, or in 
another word, the rating process. We classify the proposals into four main categories: 
Information & Accuracy, Tax, Fee & Warranty, Conflicts of Interest and Competition. 
 
5.1.1 Information and Accuracy 
 
This topic includes two aspects. Information refers to information disclosure and 
transparency. The core value of it is to reduce the cognition asymmetry regarding the 
source bases of ratings. According to the approaches of the economics of information, 
hidden information may cause adverse selection and therefore leads to the crash of the 
whole market. It is important to share the same information between the both sides of 
a transaction in order to keep a fair and equal trading environment.115 Accuracy refers 
to the reliability of the information, the ratings and the rating mechanism. It suggests 
that the CRAs should use the right mechanism and provide the correct and reliable 
ratings to the public. For instance, a fast credit crunch of those ‘AAA to D’ in a short 
term shows a reverse side of the concept of accuracy. 
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Information Transparency 
In general – information, and in detail – information sources, historical data and 
experiences and general rating methodology 
 
The transparency of information may be a fundamental. In rating process, issuers 
should provide the relevant information to the rating agency in order to make it 
possible for them to analyze. We call this information as rating-based information. 
Generally, this information contains the financial statement and etc. which by nature 
should be published to the public. So the information should be synchronously 
provided to the public in order for other people to analyze the rating of the issue by 
using their own analytical tools, just like that in CRAs. Moreover, the rating agency 
should provide the historical data of the performance it rated the similar securities, as 
well the general methods it uses to rate such a kind of the security. The purpose of this 
proposal is to provide the same or the most similar information bases for both CRAs 
and the public. Public investors, both individuals and institutions, have their own 
methods to come up with their judgments of ratings, in comparing with those issued 
by the CRAs. This is also a good way to get rid of the framing effect, according to the 
behavioural finance. If people could have enough information based on which they can 
have their own judgments, they do not have to blindly depend on the frame of the 
ratings from merely the CRAs. 
 
According to IOSCO Code of Conduct, Article 3.5,  
‘A CRA should publish sufficient information about its procedures, 
methodologies and assumptions so that outside parties can understand 
how a rating was arrived at by the CRA…’116  
And according to Article 3.8,  
‘In order to promote transparency and to enable the market to best 
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judge the performance of the ratings, the CRA, where possible, should 
publish sufficient information about the historical default rates of CRA 
rating categories…so that interested parties can understand the 
historical performance of each category…’117 
 
Separate System for Structured Products 
Structured product refers to a mixed investment approach integrated by the financial 
tools like interest rates, exchange rates, stock prices, funds, options and etc. The IOSCO 
report suggested that ‘CRAs should consider using a separate system of symbols when 
opining on the default risk and loss characteristics of a structured product.’118 The 
reason is that structured project has a very short history. Since one of the main 
methods CRAs use is to refer to the historical data, the data bases on the structured 
projects are quite shallow, not sufficient enough for referring. Based on that, IOSCO as 
well as many other specialists suggested that the CRAs should use a separate system of 
symbols to rate the structured products. In this way, investors can easier distinguish the 
ratings of structured projects from those of traditional financial products. They can 
choose whether or by what means to rely on them or not. And in case if a rating 
agency lacks reliable data or methods to opine a structured product, it should not rate 
the product. 
 
In the IOSCO Code of Conduct, Article 1.7-3, 
‘A CRA should assess whether existing methodologies and models for 
determining credit ratings of structured products are appropriate…In 
cases where the complexity or structure of a new type of structured 
product or the lack of robust data about the assets underlying the 
structured product raise serious questions as to whether the CRA can 
determine a credible credit rating for the security, CRA should refrain 
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from issuing a credit rating.’119 
And Article 3.5-b says that, 
‘A CRA should differentiate ratings of structured finance products from 
traditional corporate bond ratings, preferably through a different rating 
symbology…’120 
 
Short-term and Long-term Ratings 
IOSCO found that the ratings or most of the ratings were provided based on long-term 
views. And the agencies claimed that short-term fluctuation is possible and normal.121 
In order to improve the accuracy and reliability of the ratings, we argue that a security 
could have both a short-term and a long-term ratings. Not everyone can afford a 
long-term investment, especially those individual investors who require a short-term 
turnover. In this sense, it is important for CRAs to fast react and tell the potential 
short-term risks. This is to get rid of their excuse of, for instance, the fast credit crunch 
of the subprime mortgage housing loans during the financial crisis. 
 
5.1.2 Tax, Fee and Warranty 
 
The use of tax, fee and warranty is to work on the conflicts of interest, more likely to 
get rid of the negative influences of hidden information for investors. As we have 
defined that the investors form a stakeholder group by wide-definition to the CRAs, but 
not by narrow-definition. We believe it is important to build a stronger benefit 
relationship between them, since investors’ benefits are not likely to be protected by 
those financers’ human virtue, until now. 
 
Tax 
According to the stakeholder theory, we define investors as the supportive group of the 
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stakeholders, which has a high cooperative potential and low competitive threat. Most 
individual investors consider credit ratings as important information and they lack 
professional knowledge to come up with a rating by themselves. That is why we think it 
belongs to the supportive group. Based on that, CRAs should implement an offensive 
strategy, in order to link them and make them more favorable. The use of tax, as we 
consider, should be an approach based on this theory.  
 
We argue that a kind of tax could be issued to all the financial products being rated. 
The tax revenue forms up another source of the CRAs’ income, besides the issuers’ fee. 
In another word, issuers pay much less than that before for the ratings and investors 
who make an investment automatically pay an extra price of the products they buy. It is 
actually the investors’ fee for using the ratings. In this sense, we involve investors in as 
a stronger-related stakeholder group. As a result, CRAs benefit from issuers and 
investors, in a relatively balanced mean. Such ratings can get rid of the over-optimistic 
problem in the merely issuer-pays model, and become more accurate.  
 
It is also explainable by the two principles of tax, ability to pay and benefits principle. 
Issuers pay less rating fee and investors have more accurate ratings now. That is the 
benefits for the two groups. Ability to pay refers to that institutions have more money 
to invest, and pay more taxes for the ratings; individual investors, like you and me, on 
the contrary pay less.  
 
Warranty 
This proposal is come up based on the approach on dealing with hidden information. A 
second hand car can involve a short term warranty, and we suggest doing the same on 
investment-level products. As we have described, an investment-level rating, on 
contrary with the speculate-level rating, refers to the ratings above BB-, taking S&P’s 
symbology for instance. A security with a speculate-level rating does not have to 
involve a warranty since it is right for speculative purpose. So what we suggest is that 
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CRAs should provide a warranty-like thing in their investment-level rated securities. So 
they take the responsibility of fast credit crunch of those securities. The warranty could 
be Credit Default Swap (CDS), and it can be valid from few months to few years, based 
on the types of the securities and the levels of the ratings. For instance, a traditional 
financial product with a triple-A rating should contain a longer CDS, and a structured 
product with a triple-B rating should contain a shorter one. The core purpose of this 
proposal is to force CRAs to be more careful when issuing a rating. 
 
Tax and Subscriber Fee 
This is a further approach regarding the use of stakeholder theory and tax. In the basis 
of the information transparency and the use of tax, CRAs can provide advanced 
services for subscribers. Investor can choose to become a more relevant stakeholder by 
paying a subscriber fee. The subscribers do not have extra data bases however they 
have the right to attend internal seminars hosted by the CRAs. In the seminar, they 
meet the specialists and the analysts from the CRAs who provide face-to-face 
introduction and guidance of how to use the ratings. The seminars can be held 
regularly.  
 
5.1.3 Conflicts of Interest 
 
Conflicts of interest indicate the contradict interest relationship between issuers and 
investors in relation with the CRAs. Conflicts of interest practically display itself as the 
issuer-pays model which has been widely criticized. In the former proposals, we have 
had some issues actually for balancing the interest relationship among different 
stakeholders, but they are more likely from the investors’ part. In this section, we focus 
on the issuers’ side, with regard to weaken the issuer-pays impact. Besides, the IOSCO 
code of conduct also includes a whole chapter dealing with the CRA independence and 
the avoidance of conflicts of interest. We will also refer to some articles to support our 
arguments.  
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Recommendations from Analysts 
In rating structured finance securities, CRAs are doing more than just rating. Analysts 
may provide advice to the issuers on how to design the structures. According to the 
IOSCO report, ‘CRAs will provide a “private rating” based on a pro forma credit 
assessment of the impact of a potential transaction on the company’s credit ratings.’122 
Other investigations have also mentioned the same problem.123 It is argued that the 
CRAs should avoid analysts from getting in touch with the issuers regarding the 
structure of the securities. In another word, analysts should issue a rating based on 
only the information provided and the rating methodology. The connection between 
issuers and analysts would cause problems on the conflicts of interest. 
 
This has been written into the IOSCO code of conduct. Article 2.3 says, 
‘The determination of a credit rating should be influenced only by 
factors relevant to the credit assessment.’124 
And the following Article 2.5 further declares, 
‘A CRA should separate, operationally and legally, its credit rating 
business and CRA analysts from any other businesses of the CRA, 
including consulting businesses, that may present a conflict of 
interest…’125 
 
Consulting Fee 
This is another approach to avoid issuers being involved in the rating process. 
According to Code of Conduct, Article 2.4, 
‘The credit rating a CRA assigns to an issuer or security should not be 
affected by the existence of or potential for a business relationship 
                                                      
122 IOSCO, 2008, The role of credit rating agencies in structured finance markets – final report, p.12 
123 Goodhart, 2010, p.170; Sy, 2009 
124 IOSCO, 2008, Code of Conduct, p.7 
125 IOSCO, 2008, Code of Conduct, p.7 
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between the CRA (or its affiliates) and the issuer (or its affiliates) or any 
other party, or the non-existence of such a relationship.’126 
In practice, issuers can choose several rating agencies to rate their structured securities, 
and after that they choose only one agency to issue the rating. The fee is paid only if 
the credit rating is issued.127 
 
In this case, it is quite easy for CRA to provide a higher rating, or the positive 
recommendation to the issuer to adjust the structure to get a rating they want, so to 
speak, the conflicts of interest. We suggest, based on the IOSCO report, that the CRAs 
should issue a consulting fee, as close much as the rating fee, or simply require the 
completed rating fee at the beginning of the rating process.128 
 
Big Customer 
This proposal deals with the conflict of interest problem if there is a core client for a 
CRA’s business. We take out this approach directly from the IOSCO Code of Conduct, in 
Article 2.8-b, 
‘A CRA should disclose if it receives 10 percent or more of its annual 
revenue from a single issuer, originator, arranger, client or subscriber 
(including any affiliates of that issuer, originator, arranger, client or 
subscriber).’129 
This is a reference and a direction. The number ‘10’ percent might not be applicable for 
all the CRAs. But the concept is important. In case there is big customer that 
contributes a large percentage of a CRA’s revenue, they should let the public know. This 
is a supervising approach that all investors can pay attention and examine whether the 
rating the CRA assigns to its big customer is proper. 
 
                                                      
126 IOSCO, 2008, Code of Conduct, p.7 
127 IOSCO, 2008, Code of Conduct, p.7 
128 Goodhart, 2010, p.170 
129 IOSCO, 2008, Code of Conduct, p.8 
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5.1.4 Competition 
 
Competition is actually a new discussion, comparing with the other critiques. The main 
issue is that the rating business is a kind of oligopoly by the two major corporations, 
the S&P and the Moody’s. This is considered as one of the reasons ratings are not that 
accurate, since the oligopoliers do not have to worry about their market shares. 
However, the entry barrier of this business is quite high. People do not easily believe a 
new entrant and its speciality. As a result, to construct a competitive environment in 
the rating business is not that easy and could take a long time. In the IOSCO Code of 
Conduct, Competition issuers are ignored, since it only deals with the behaviours of the 
existing CRAs. 
 
In Katz et al.’s report for the World Bank, there is a good discussion on promoting 
competition in the rating business. We found one approach which is interesting, and 
we would like to share the idea here. 
 
It is named the hybrid solutions. The idea is that any security or issuer that wants to be 
rated, must have two ratings from two separate CRAs. One of the agencies is paid by 
the issuer and the other agency earns money from subscribers / investors. The two 
agencies must be independent from each other; so to speak, one of them must not be 
the subsidiary of the other one, or similar. And they should work on the rating process 
by using the same information provided by the issuer.130 
 
This proposal, we think, is good as it provides solutions for many problems. Now, the 
CRAs who use investor-pays model are not so many and probably the small agencies. 
This proposal can raise their popularity and influence. Based on the equal information 
disclosure, if any of the smaller agencies has a similar or even a higher rating accuracy 
                                                      
130 See also Katz et al., 2009 
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than those big ones, it is very easy for people to remember its name. As a result, the 
rating services and accuracy will improve. In addition, since the solution involves both 
issuers and investors in, the problem of conflicts of interest would be mitigated. People 
can consider, by themselves, either one is more reliable. In one word, to build a 
competitive environment is a booster to synchronously solve many other problems. 
 
 
5.2 Post-rating 
 
Post-rating concept refers to the regulatory proposals after the ratings are issued, in 
another word, the supervising and updating process, and the timeliness of the ratings. 
We classify the proposals into two main categories, with similar ones in the pre-rating 
categories: Information and Accuracy, and Conflicts of Interest. 
 
5.2.1 Information and Accuracy 
 
Similar with the pre-rating one, this category deals with the information transparency 
and the rating accuracy. We argue that they are not merely important in the rating 
process, but equally important after the ratings being issued. 
 
Updated Information 
The rated security or issuer may have recent development with updated information 
such as financial report and etc. These new information may influence the rating level 
and the possibility of credit default. We argue that the information disclosure should 
be lasted for long term, after the rating has been assigned to the issuer. Issuers should 
update information on recent development to the CRA and the public. As well, CRAs 
should revise the issued ratings regularly. 
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According to the IOSCO Statement of Principles, Article 1.2, 
‘CRAs should monitor on an ongoing basis and regularly update an 
analysis and rating once a rating is issued whenever new information 
becomes available that causes the rating agency to revise or terminate 
its opinion.’131 
The Code of Conduct has more detailed suggestions, Article 1.9 suggests,  
‘A CRA should ensure that adequate personnel and financial resources 
are allocated to monitoring and updating its ratings. Except for ratings 
that clearly indicate they do not entail ongoing surveillance, once a 
rating is published the CRA should monitor on an ongoing basis and 
update the rating by:  
a.  regularly reviewing the issuer’s creditworthiness;  
b.  initiating a review of the status of the rating upon becoming aware 
of any information that might reasonably be expected to result in a 
rating action (including termination of a rating), consistent with the 
applicable rating methodology; and, 
c.  updating on a timely basis the rating, as appropriate, based on the 
results of such review.’132 
 
Explanation on the Ratings Updated 
Furthermore, when a CRA revise a rating, it should provide explanation on the reasons 
of such revise, together with the relevant updates on information and rating 
methodologies, if any. The Code of Conduct explains the contents needed for such 
explanation in more details.  
 
Based on the Article 3.6, 
‘When issuing or revising a rating, the CRA should explain in its press 
                                                      
131 IOSCO, 2003, p.2 
132 IOSCO, 2008, Code of Conduct, p.5-6 
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releases and reports the key elements underlying the rating opinion.’133 
And also Article 3.3, 
‘…Where the rating is based on more than one methodology, or where a 
review of only the principal methodology night cause investors to 
overlook other important aspects of the rating, the CRA should explain 
this fact in the ratings announcement, and indicate where a discussion 
of how the different methodologies and other important aspects 
factored into the rating decision.’134 
 
5.2.2 Conflicts of Interest 
 
To best avoid the crisis of hidden action, based on the information transparency, the 
analysts should be involved in the supervising process and to take responsibility for the 
investors, not the issuers, after the ratings have already been issued. We come up with 
this proposal which appears from the integration of the Tax and the Hybrid Solutions 
approaches. The core concept to avoid the conflicts of interest in the post-rating period 
is similar with the pre-rating ones, to strengthen the stakeholder relationship between 
CRAs and investors, and weaken that between CRAs and issuers. 
 
We suggest that a small fee could be added into the final price of the rated securities, 
like tax, so investors pay more on their investment. This fee is used as the cost for 
supervising and updating the issued ratings. So to speak, in case issuers pay for the 
rating process, investors pay for the supervising and updating costs. In this way, 
investors’ benefits are better involved. CRAs could take their responsibility to monitor 
and revise the ratings as timely as possible.  
 
 
                                                      
133 IOSCO, 2008, Code of Conduct, p.11 
134 IOSCO, 2008, Code of Conduct, p.10 
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5.3 Third-party Regulation 
 
This proposal is independent and should be implemented thoroughly across the whole 
business phases. The idea is based on the CSR approaches. As Moon et al. argued that 
the CSR status in the US is still at the ‘self-government’ level, we suggest that it could 
be better if government is more involved in this business area as regulator. It will be 
good for not only the market but also the government itself, since the CRAs are rating 
your bonds. The government should get rid of the possibility that an inaccurate rating 
would damage the state financial security and stability. To learn from the lessons of 
Greece, and the S&P who downgraded the American bonds from AAA to AA+, the US 
government should rethink about its role in the market regulation of the rating 
business.  
 
Right now, people mostly consider CSR as philanthropic contributions to the society, or 
a kind of business strategy. It is obviously not very likely that CSR could be taken into 
consideration by those CRAs’ virtue. CSR, we think, is like an extension of the 
Stakeholder Theory, especially with relevance to the broader / wider involvement of 
the stakeholders. It is as Freeman defined that government could be involved, with the 
wide-definition of the stakeholder groups. The outside stakeholders, like the investors 
who do not have a real beneficial link with the CRAs yet, are actually very significant. 
And that’s why many of the proposals we have already mentioned focus to bring the 
investors and their benefits into consideration.  
 
Therefore, we suggest establishing an independent third-party regulator which could 
be either government body or a large accounting firm. The Nationally Recognized 
Statistical Rating Organization (NRSRO) in the US can actually play such role, but of 
course more works than currently have to be taken. For instance, the works should 
include tracing the information updates, rating accuracy, competition status, and 
reviewing complaints and coincidence to the code of conduct, etc.  
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Moreover, Goodhart has similar discussion in his work ‘How Should CRAs Be 
Regulated?’. He mentioned, in that article, to build an independent assessment 
institution which he names as a CRA Assessment Center (CRAAC). ‘All CRAs in every 
country should be required to place with CRAAC a record of each product rated and an 
initial quantified forecast of product default and a measure of the uncertainty of that 
forecast annually through the life of that product.’135 The CRAAC does not have to have 
a big body, so it is quite cheap for CRAs to spend a part of their revenues to set it up. 
We believe that the proposal is not independent, and is better to be implemented 
integratively with other proposals. For instance, if the revenues of CRAs used to set up 
such a CRAAC are from customers of both issuers and investors, CRAAC can better act 
to protect the customers especially the investors’ interests, and get rid of the conflicts 
of interest. Otherwise, CRAAC would tend to be complicit with the CRAs, since they are 
benefited by the same relationship, from the issuers or few big clients. 
 
 
5.4 Summary 
 
In this chapter, we have provided some regulatory proposals, according to our problem 
formulation, to improve the rating accuracy and reliability, and to weaken the credit 
default impact. The proposals are based on the previous demonstration on the 
theories and background analysis. We divide the proposals into three main categories 
based on the rating procedure. 
 
Firstly, pre-rating deals with the regulations in the rating process or the phase before a 
rating is finally assigned to the issuer. This category includes approaches on how to 
ensure the ratings to be accurate, to be summarized. The section is subdivided into 
                                                      
135 Goodhart, 2010, p.176-177 
 64 / 71 
four aspects. Information and Accuracy is about information and data based on which a 
security is analyzed and the rating is issued. The main idea is that rating based 
information should be disclosed equally to the CRAs and the public. The other 
categories as a whole focus on avoiding the conflicts of interest and involving investors’ 
benefits. Tax, Fee and Warranty provide the expenses-based approaches to protect 
investors’ interests. Conflicts of Interest look at the problem from the issuer side, or 
the issuer-CRA relationship. Competition is about to raise the smaller rating agencies, 
by whom to improve the rating services and accuracy, and to benefit the public 
investors.  
 
It is followed by the second category, the post-rating phase which indicates the 
monitoring or supervising process of the business. The core purpose is to ensure fast 
reaction on the information updates which cause the corresponding rating updates. 
Information disclosure is as well important. And the approaches aiming at the conflicts 
of interest in this period are to avoid CRAs from neglecting rating updates. As a result, 
the ratings should always be kept latest and accurate at the moment. 
 
Third-party Regulation should be set up as a foundation in order to better regulate the 
rating business. A third-party should be independent from CRAs and other authorities. 
Its main function is to supervise the CRAs’ business behaviours, in coincidence with the 
IOSCO code of conduct or the CRAs’ own code of conduct based on the national 
legislation. The proper business behaviours include, for instance, ensuring information 
transparency, avoiding conflicts of interest, updating ratings in time and etc. The 
third-party should also play an important role in the reform implementation as well as 
monitoring the new regulations, if there is any in the future. 
 
The proposals are interrelated, for instance, to implement one of the approaches 
under Tax, fee and Warranty might be sufficient to bring in investors’ interests. Similarly, 
the hybrid solutions can be used as an alternative, but more than that it builds the 
 65 / 71 
competition environment at the same time. Information transparency and disclosure is 
always important. It is the prerequisite for the other proposals. After that, the 
third-party supervision acts as the necessary guarantee. These ought to be carried out 
synchronously. As a whole, we would like to say that some proposals under the same 
section are probably alternative and substituted, while the ones from different 
categories are mostly complementary and interdependent. The proposals could be 
selected to form an integrated program which can therefore be implemented as a 
whole. 
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6 Conclusion 
 
 
Review 
This project is about the CRAs and the rating business in the US. Our initial motivation 
came from the financial crisis on which we tended to analyze the CRAs’ the role and 
impact. It was well known that the CRAs were very much involved in the financial crisis, 
and their activities were seriously criticized. Following that, we drew the problem 
formulation on how to better regulate the CRAs in order to have the ratings more 
accurate and reliable, and to reduce the possibility and the damage of the credit 
default.  
 
To work on the problem formulation, we therefore refer to both the theoretical and the 
empirical basis. With regard to the theories, we firstly have behavioural finance which 
explains people’s habits on making financial investment decisions. This is relevant to 
how investors look at the ratings issued by the CRAs. It is followed by theories on 
hidden information and hidden action which explain the significance of information 
transparency and disclosure of the credit rating business. Then, stakeholder theory is 
to answer and analyze the problem of conflicts of interest in the rating process. It helps 
to explain the importance of public investors as a stakeholder group. Tax and 
competition concepts, from the other ways, try to solve the problem of conflicts of 
interest by macroeconomic regulation and controlling approaches. The tax approaches 
are to make investors pay for the ratings and the rating services, by which to increase 
the contribution the investors make to the CRAs’ revenues. Competition approach is to 
reform the market environment. It is a big project, works on many problems but takes 
time. Besides, we also have the CSR approaches to demonstrate the importance of 
independent third-party supervising. It is a safeguard to all the obligations of the CRAs. 
 
After that, we have described the background and the problems of the rating agencies 
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and the business development. We more detailedly explain the business model and the 
problems of the rating process. Then, we refer to the IOSCO Statement of Principles 
and the Code of Conduct which have tried to regulate the operational behaviours of 
the CRAs in detailed issues. And finally before our discussion on the regulatory 
proposals, we do a stakeholder analysis to understand the situation, as a preparation 
for the analysis in the next chapter. Thereby, we provide some regulatory proposals 
which are mostly based on our own points of views. We also refer to a few other 
materials as well as the IOSCO Code of Conduct, in order to support and supplement 
our proposals.  
 
Problem Formulation 
We hereby try to answer the problem formulation. We believe that the approaches to 
regulate the CRAs and their business procedure are multi-perspective. The two main 
aspects are accuracy and timeliness. Accuracy, based on our project, refers to the 
pre-rating phase. All the regulatory orientations, after all, work to improve the rating 
accuracy and reliability, relating to the problem formulation. The other aspect 
timeliness refers to the post-rating phase. It works to maintain the timeliness of the 
ratings in order to keep the timely and long-term rating accuracy. According to the 
problem formulation, timeliness corresponds to minimize the impact of credit default. 
Besides, we have third-party regulation which works for both accuracy and timeliness. 
It is like a supervisor to the rating business, monitoring the whole business process of 
the CRAs.  
 
If we distinguish the proposals into different functional categories, it could generally be 
information disclosure, conflicts of interest, third-party supervision and, if specified, 
competition as an independent one out of conflicts of interest. Information disclosure, 
both pre-rating and post-rating, should go first. It is the prerequisite for the 
implementation of other proposals and the code of conduct. Followed by the 
approaches to get rid of the conflicts of interest, in another word, it functions to better 
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involve the investors’ interests. Third-party supervision is similar with the discussion 
above. And competition is a new perspective, tends to focus the problem on the 
business environment. 
 
To better regulate the CRAs, we would like to say that the proposals should be 
combined as a whole system and be implemented as a project. For instance, 
information disclosure should be followed and supervised thoroughly of the whole 
process, so are the proposals to avoid the conflicts of interest. Synchronously, the 
independent regulator should guide and supervise the overall progress. Apart from 
that, small agencies are getting more power of discourse based on the hybrid solution. 
Anyway, it is a systematic program to regulate the CRAs. There is no time to delay for 
making a change, since the protest is ongoing. 
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